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INTRODUCTION
How many "cruel and unusual punishments" clauses are there? Michael
Mannheimer, in his article, Cruel and Unusual Federal Punishments, argues
that there are two-one for the federal government and one for state
governments. Mannheimer contends that courts have been unduly
neglecting the former and mistakenly applying the latter to the federal
government without adequate reflection.2 Mannheimer further argues that
the Eighth Amendment is primarily a device to promote state sovereignty
and that we should accordingly read it as requiring that federal punishments
be no more severe than state punishments for equivalent crimes. I cannot
do justice in this brief Response to the richness of Mannheimer's various
arguments, so I will limit myself to three comments.
First, if, as Mannheimer argues, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence has
been "driven by concerns of federalism,"4 then it seems to follow that such
federalism concerns should play no role when asking whether federal
punishments are cruel and unusual. However, as I will argue below,
federalism has played only a minor role in the Court's proportionality
jurisprudence and taking its federalism concerns out of the equation is thus
unlikely to make much of a difference. Second, Mannheimer's thesis that
the Eighth Amendment should be read as a device to promote state
sovereigntyi has drastic implications about the Eighth Amendment's ability
to regulate state punishments, and such implications may well constitute a
reason to reject his account. Third, the existing proportionality
jurisprudence, with some adjustments, can easily accommodate
Mannheimer's concerns about the excessive scope and harshness of the
federal criminal law and adopting Mannheimer's account is not necessary
to devise a theoretical basis for the Eighth Amendment to regulate federal
criminal law and punishment.
I. IS THE PROPORTIONALITYJURISPRUDENCE FEDERALISM-DRIVEN?
Mannheimer argues that the Supreme Court's proportionality doctrine
has been "driven by concerns of federalism"' and that the Court has
"proceeded from the assumption that concerns of federalism figure greatly in
determining the precise bounds of the proportionality requirement."8
t. Michael J. Zydney Mannheiner, Cruel and Unusual Federal Punishments, 98 IOWA L. REV.
6g (2012).
2. Id. at 7 2.
3. Id. at 73.
4. Id. at i3o.
5. See id. at ioo-og.
6. See id. at 74-80.
7. Id. at 130.
8. Id. at 87 (emphasis added).
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Mannheimer attributes the Court's "extreme deference" to such "federalism
concerns,"g and wonders what "the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause,
in its pure form, free from concerns about federalism" would look like.o It
seems to me that the answer is that it would not look all that different, as I
believe he overstates the role of federalism in the Court's jurisprudence.
What is driving the Court's jurisprudence, rather, is the Court's reluctance
to take a side on debates over competing theories of punishment.
There is, to be sure, some textual support for Mannheimer's position.
For instance, in Ewing v. Califontia, which upheld a prison term of twenty-five
years to life under California's three-strikes law for shoplifting by a repeat
offender," Justice O'Connor wrote in the plurality opinion that "[t]hough
three strikes laws may be relatively new, our tradition of deferring to state
legislatures in making and implementing such important policy decisions is
longstanding,",, that "[s]electing the sentencing rationales is generally a
policy choice to be made by state legislatures, not federal courts,",, and that
"[ilt is enough that the State of California has a reasonable basis for
believing that dramatically enhanced sentences for habitual felons
'advance [s] the goals of [its] criminal justice system in any substantial
way."' And in Harmelin v. Michigan, Justice Kennedy wrote in his influential
concurring opinion that "marked divergences both in underlying theories of
sentencing and in the length of prescribed prison terms are the inevitable,
often beneficial, result of the federal structure."5
However, consider other parts ofJustice Kennedy's opinion in Harmelin.
While he named "the nature of our federal system"1b as one of the
fundamental "principles that give content to the uses and limits of
proportionality review," he named four other principles in addition, and
these were "the primacy of the legislature,"'t "the variety of legitimate
penological schemes,",' the need for "objective factors to the maximum
possible extent,"'9 and the supposition that "[t]he Eighth Amendment does
not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence."o Justice
9. Id. at 74.
10. Id. at go.
1 i. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30-31 (0o3) (plurality opinion).
12. Id. at 24.
13. Id. at 25.
14. Id. at 28 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S.
277, 297 n.22 (1983)).
15. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 999 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing
Solem, 463 U.S. at 291 n.17).
16. Id. at iooi.
17. Id.
18. Id.
ig. Id. at iooo (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274-75 (198o)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
o. Id. at tooi.
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Kennedy's listing of factors suggests that the Court's weak proportionality
jurisprudence may be overdetermined, and subtracting the federalism
concerns from the equation likely would not make a large difference to it.
One could avoid this conclusion, of course, by arguing that federalism
concerns are of such paramount importance that they constitute the driving
force behind all the other factors. That is, perhaps the Kennedy
concurrence cites the need to defer to legislatures because the legislatures it
has in mind are state legislatures, it talks about "the variety of legitimate
penological schemes" because of the felt need to defer to prerogatives of state
governments to devise their own criminal justice policies, it requires
"objective factors" because of its view that federal judges should not strike
down state policies on the basis of mere subjective preferences, and the
Court "does not require strict proportionality"", because of its deference to
state sovereignty. It seems to me, however, that this federalism-based
explanation is false.
To see why the proposed explanation fails, consider one of the
principles that Justice Kennedy mentioned, "the variety of legitimate
penological schemes."? He explained that "the Eighth Amendment does
not mandate adoption of any one penological theory," as "[t]he federal and
state criminal systems have accorded different weights at different times to
the penological goals of retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation.""2A Justice O'Connor took this idea and developed it further in
Ewing, in which she, after citing Harmelin for the proposition that
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation are all legitimate
aims of punishment, stated that "[s]ome or all of these justifications may
play a role in a State's sentencing scheme" and that "[s]electing the
sentencing rationales is generally a policy choice to be made by state
legislatures, not federal courts."'4 She went on to note that "[r]ecidivism has
long been recognized as a legitimate basis for increased punishment" and
that California has an interest in incapacitating repeat offenders and
deterring crimes.2 She concluded by announcing that "[i]t is enough that
the State ... has a reasonable basis for believing that ... [the punishments it
imposes] 'advance[] the goals of [its] criminal justice system in any
substantial way.'" 6
In my view, these passages show that what characterizes the Court's
jurisprudence in this area is not federalism, but a reluctance to adjudicate
among the traditional justifications of punishment. This feature of the law,
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 999.
24. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003) (plurality opinion).
25. Id. at 25-27.
26. Id. at 28 (last two alterations in original) (quoting Solern v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 297-
98 n.22 (1983)).
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which Mannheimer himself notes,7 becomes even more apparent if we look
at the Court's proportionality cases in the capital context.8
In the last few decades, the Court's proportionality jurisprudence
applied the following two-part test in evaluating proportionality challenges
in the capital context. 29 First, the Court reviews legislation and sentencing
practices to identify an objective national consensus on the sentencing
practice in question.o Second, the Court engages in an independent
proportionality analysis to determine whether the Court agrees or disagrees
with the national consensus) 1 The proportionality analysis, in turn, consists
of two tests-the culpability test and the purposes of punishment test.32
Under the culpability test, the Court considers the culpability of the crime
or the criminal.;s The purposes of punishment test, in turn, considers
whether the punishment would advance either the retribution or deterrence
purposes of punishment. 4
The relationship between the culpability test and the purposes of
punishment test has not always been clear. The Court has stated that a
punishment that does not advance one of the purposes of punishment "is
nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and
suffering,"m but what happens if a punishment passes the purposes of
punishment test by advancing, say, the deterrence or incapacitation
purposes, but fails the culpability test?
A review of the Court's recent cases shows that the Court has not been
eager to face this question. Every time it struck down a sentencing practice,
the Court also magically produced the conclusion that the practice in
question failed not only the culpability test but also the purposes of
punishment test. In Roper v. Simmons, the Court, declaring a juvenile death
penalty unconstitutional, "conclud[ed] that neither retribution nor
deterrence provides adequate justification for imposing the death penalty
on juvenile offenders."6 In Atkins v. Virginia, the Court, holding that the
27. Mannheimer, supra note t, at 83-84 ("The almost complete deference the Court has
afforded to legislative bodies to dictate the appropriate punishment for crime . . . . is the
predictable, perhaps inexorable, result of a doctrine that allows legislative decisions about
punishment to be justified on any one of the major, often competing, theories of
punishment. . . .").
28. The next few paragraphs draw from Youngjae Lee, The Pumposes of Punishment Test, 23
FED. SEN'c, REP. 58 (2010).
29. Starting with Graham v. Florida, the Court began to apply the test in noncapital cases as
well. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
3o. Id. at 2022.
31. See id. at 2o2-23.
32. Id. at 2026.
33. Id. at 2026-28.
34. Id. at 2028-3o.
35. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion).
36. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572 (2005).
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death penalty is unconstitutional when imposed on mentally retarded
offenders, stated that it was "not persuaded that the execution of mentally
retarded criminals will measurably advance the deterrent or the retributive
purpose of the death penalty."'? In Kennedy v. Louisiana, too, the Court
found that "the death penalty for child rape would not further retributive
purposes"38 and that "punishment by death may not result in more
deterrence or more effective enforcement."39
However, the Court's application of the purposes of punishment test is
often so half-hearted and weak, it is not clear how seriously the Court itself
takes the test. Consider, for instance, the Roper Court's analysis of the
deterrence question. The Court argued "that juveniles will be less
susceptible to deterrence"4o by noting "[t]he likelihood that the teenage
offender has made the kind of cost-benefit analysis that attaches any weight
to the possibility of execution is so remote as to be virtually nonexistent."41
The Court did not say how it came to this conclusion, even though the truth
of the statement is hardly self-evident, keeping in mind that the teenagers in
question could potentially be seventeen-year-olds. The Court then added, as
if acknowledging the speculative nature of its analysis, "To the extent the
juvenile death penalty might have [a] residual deterrent effect, it is worth
noting that the punishment of life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole is itself a severe sanction, in particular for a young person."42 But life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole is a severe sanction for
everyone, not just juveniles. Was the Court in effect saying that the death
penalty has no marginal deterrence value as a general matter? Such a
position would be respectable, but the Court cited no evidence for what is
perhaps one of the most contested claims in criminology.43 That the Court
was willing to conclude from such a flimsy set of steps that the deterrence
goal was not advanced is especially odd given that the Court prefaced its
analysis with the proposition that "[i]n general we leave to legislatures the
assessment of the efficacy of various criminal penalty schemes."44
The Court also does not always seem to recognize that the deterrence
value of imposing the death penalty on one group cannot be measured
simply by asking whether members of that group would be deterred from
37. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (200o).
38. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 442 (2008).
39. Id. at 445.
40. Ropet; 543 U.S. at 571.
41. Id. at 572 (alteration in original) (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 8i5, 837
(1988) (plurality opinion)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., John J. Donohue & Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses of EFmpirical Fidence in the
Death Penalty Debate, 58 STAN. L. REV. 791 (2005); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is
Capital Punishment Morally Rpquired? Acts, Omissions, and Lite-Life Tradeoffi, 58 STAN. L. REV. 703
(1005).
44. Rope'; 543 U.S. at 571.
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committing a crime. Nothing in the idea of deterrence limits the relevant
group of potentially deterred offenders to the group whose fate would be
directly affected by the punishment practice in question. That is, if
executing an insane person fails to deter insane people from committing
crimes but successfully deters a sane person from committing a crime, then
that deterrence value has to be included in the overall deterrence
calculation. Neither is there anything absurd about the idea of deterring
homicides by being ruthless about less serious offenses, nor is it far-fetched
to imagine a person of average intelligence being deterred from committing
a crime after learning about an execution of a mentally retarded offender.45
The Court's deterrence analysis tends to either ignore this aspect entirely, as
it did in Roper, or simply brush it aside with a blanket assertion that
exempting one group from the death penalty will not make a difference to
other groups, as it did in Athins.46 To be sure, the Court may in fact be right
on all of these issues. However, the point is not that the Court is wrong but
rather that complex empirical questions are involved, and the Court's
attempt to wade into the controversy has not been a model of sound
reasoning.
It has not always been like this. In Coker v. Georgia, in deciding that the
death penalty for the crime of rape is unconstitutional,47 the Court, after
mentioning the culpability test and the purposes of punishment test, stated
that " [a] punishment might fail the test on either ground."48 The Court later
made the same point in a footnote by stating, "Because the death sentence is
a disproportionate punishment for rape, it is cruel and unusual punishment
within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment even though it may measurably
serve the legitimate ends of punishment and therefore is not invalid for its failure to do
so."49 The Court ultimately decided the case by relying exclusively on the
culpability test, paying little attention to the purposes of punishment test.5o
So what explains the Court's recent attempts to demonstrate that a
punishment has no deterrence value whenever it has sought to invalidate a
sentencing practice-especially when no such showing is necessary
according to Coker? The answer, again, is that the Court has been trying hard
to avoid engaging with deep philosophical issues regarding the purposes of
45. For a similar argument, see H.L.A. HART, Pt NISIIMENT AND RESPONSIlillllY: EssAYs IN
THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAw ig (1968) (criticizing a view similar to the Court's as relying on "a
spectacular non sequitur").
46. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320-21 (2002).
47. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 6oo (1977) (plurality opinion).
48. Id. at 592 (emphasis added).
49. Id. at 592 n.4 (emphasis added).
50. To the extent that it paid attention to the deterrence question, it appears to be
confined to the following single sentence in a footnote, which implies an extremely demanding
version of the purposes of punishment test: "We observe that ... it would be difficult to support
a claim that the death penalty for rape is an indispensable part of the States' criminal justice
system." Id.
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punishment and what limitations should be placed on it. If neither a
retribution nor a deterrence goal is advanced, then the Court need not face
the difficult task of sorting through the vexed issue of what to do when
retribution and deterrence theories give conflicting counsel and how to
strike a balance when the two conflict. This approach, in turn, stems from
the fact that the Court has been reluctant to devise a theory of Eighth
Amendment proportionality jurisprudence that prioritizes one theory of
punishment over the others. Its current jurisprudence has accordingly been
designed to find a path that allows the Court to make decisions with minimal
philosophical commitments.rjl
One could still maintain that this phenomenon can be attributed to
"concerns of federalism"a-that the Court's reluctance to engage debates
within criminal law about competing philosophies of punishment stems
from its respect for state sovereignty, and so on-however, I find it difficult
to see it that way. What I instead see is a deep skepticism among Justices
regarding the wisdom of picking sides on contentious debates about
punishment and a concern about appearing hubristic and anti-democratic
by restricting the government's ability to combat crime. I find it highly
unlikely that such a deep-seated insecurity and skepticism would suddenly
evaporate once the Court shifts its focus away from state governments and
towards the federal government.
II. IS THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT A STATE SOVEREIGNTY PROTECTING
PROVISION?
Regardless of what the Supreme Court has done and will do in the
future, Mannheimer appears to be more interested in making a normative
argument about what the Supreme Court, and other courts interpreting the
Eighth Amendment, ought to do. Mannheimer argues throughout the article
that "[t]he Eighth Amendment ... was concerned primarily with protecting
the States' interests and those of their respective citizens vis-A1-vis the new,
powerful central government,"A that "state power was thought to be the
principal protection for individual rights,"54 that "we fool ourselves into
thinking that the provisions of the Bill of Rights have an individual-rights-
colored hue")) when it fact the primary purpose of the Bill of Rights was to
"preserv[e] state primacy in the criminal-justice arena,"5 that "the right to
be free from cruel and unusual punishment is largely about local control of
51. For a more detailed discussion of this feature of the Court's proportionality
jurisprudence in both capital and noncapital contexts, see Youngjae Lee, International Consensus
as Persuasive Authority in the Eighth Amendment, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 63, i 1-14 (007).
52. Mannheiner, supra note i, at 87.
53. Id. at ioo.
54. Id. at ioi.
55. Id. at i 06.
56. Id. at 107.
76 [Vol. 98:6g
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criminal justice,"57 and that " [a] t [the] core [of the Eighth Amendment] is a
judgment that criminal justice is largely better left to the States."58
Mannheimer's argument for these propositions stems from his analysis
of historical records and the Framers' understandings and expectations. I
leave the merits of his historical account aside; my main concern is that a
doctrinal approach based on his reading of the provision would eviscerate
most of the existing Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. As Mannheimer
himself emphasizes, Eighth Amendment proportionality jurisprudence has
developed almost exclusively through state cases.59 Over time, the Supreme
Court has ruled that the death penalty is disproportionately harsh for the
crime of rape (Coher v. Georgia)oo even if the victim is a child (Kennedy v.
Louisiana),b' for someone who does not kill or intend to kill but is convicted
under a felony murder statute for aiding and abetting a murder (Enmund v.
Florida),$2 for a crime committed when the criminal was under the age of
eighteen (Roper v. Simmons), s or for a mentally retarded criminal (Atkins v.
Virginia). 4 The Court has also ruled that the Eighth Amendment prohibits a
sentence of life in prison without parole for a nonhomicide crime
committed by a minor (Graham v. Florida)65 and a mandatory sentence of life
in prison without parole for a crime committed by a minor, even for
homicide crimes (Miller v. Alabama).66
Every single one of the aforementioned cases is a state case, and these
are just proportionality cases under the Eighth Amendment. The cruel and
unusual punishment jurisprudence of the Eighth Amendment contains
much more, as it consists of roughly four categories of cases. The first
category prohibits certain types of punishments, such as burning at the
stake, crucifixion, drawing and quartering, and torture.S' In the second are
constitutionally permitted types of punishments that are nevertheless
unconstitutional because they are disproportionate to the crimes for which
57. Id.
58. Id. at 130.
59. Id. at So ("[A]Ill of the cases the [Supreme] Court has decided concerning the
proportionality of sentences have arisen under state law . . . .").
6o. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 6oo (1977) (plurality opinion).
6i. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 446-47 (2oo8).
62. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797, 8ot (1982).
63. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578-79 (2005).
64. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320-21 (2002).
65. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (010).
66. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012).
67. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 170-71 (1976) (plurality opinion)
(discussing whether torture as a means of execution was constitutional under early Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446-47 (1890) (recognizing the
duty of courts, under the Eighth Amendment, to proscribe cruel and unusual punishment, even
where such punishment is prescribed by state law); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-36
(1878) (discussing historical torture scenarios as cruel and unusual punishment).
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they are imposed; these are the previously mentioned proportionality
cases." The third category includes the so-called "super due process for
death" 9 or "death is different"o cases, which allow sentences of death only
after procedures mandated and approved by the Supreme Court have been
satisfied.7' Finally, in the fourth category are punishments that satisfy the
requirements of type, proportionality, and procedure but are nevertheless
unconstitutional because of how they are administered. Prison conditions so
inhumane that they cross the constitutional line to become "cruel and
unusual" fall into this group.'? Most of these cases, too, concern
punishments imposed by state governments.
If Mannheimer is correct that "[t]he Eighth Amendment . . . was
concerned primarily with protecting the States' interests,"73 that the primary
purpose of the Bill of Rights was to "preserv[e] state primacy in the criminal-
justice arena,"74 that "the right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment is largely about local control of criminal justice,"75 and that
"[a]t [the] core [of the Eighth Amendment] is a judgment that criminal
justice is largely better left to the States,",6 and if Mannheimer is also
arguing that this original understanding of the Eighth Amendment should
govern our interpretation of it today, then it seems likely that most of the
Eighth Amendmentjurisprudence is built on a colossal mistake. It is unclear
from the Article what Mannheimer thinks of the constitutional restrictions
on punishment that the Court has imposed through these cases, and how
the Eighth Amendment ought to be enforced against the states.
68. See, eqg., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 599-6oo (1977) (plurality opinion) (holding
that a death sentence for rape was grossly disproportionate and forbidden by the Eighth
Amendment). A subcategory of this includes constitutional restrictions on what may be
criminalized. See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 66o, 667-68 (1962) (holding it
unconstitutional to criminalize drug addiction).
69. See Margaret Jane Radin, Crtel Punishment and Respect fr Persons: Super Due Process fir
Death, 53 S. CAL L. REV. 1143 (1o98).
70. See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on wo
Decades o/ Constitutional Igrulalion o/ Capital Punishment, og HARV. L. REV. 355, 370-71 (1995)
(explaining the influence of the "death is different" argument in the Court's capital
punishmentjurisprudence).
71. See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-05 (1976) (plurality
opinion); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 2o6-07 (requiring the finding of at least one statutory aggravating
factor before the death penalty will be imposed); see also Steiker & Steiker, supra note 63, at
371-403 (providing a comprehensive summary and discussion of the Court's capital
punishmentjurisprudence).
72. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 1o2o3 (1976) (describing the government's
obligation to provide medical care for inmates).
73. Mannheiner, supra note i, at ioo.
74. Id. at 107.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 130.
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Perhaps, since the Eighth Amendment does apply to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment, all of these cases would stay intact under
Mannheimer's analysis, and his arguments would solely concern federal
punishments. But that option is not available to him. If his reading of the
Eighth Amendment is correct, it is not clear what it would even mean to
enforce it against the states. His argument is that the Eighth Amendment, by
its nature, must be viewed as a constraint on the federal government and as
a device for protecting state sovereignty. This argument seems to further
imply that the idea of the Eighth Amendment constraining state
governments is probably a contradiction in terms. Mannheimer may not be
bothered by this implication, or maybe there is a way to avoid the
implication altogether, but he has not articulated how to do so. The only
doctrinal consequence that Mannheimer discusses involves placing
restrictions on the federal government, but the obvious question that arises
is what to make of the drastic implications of his theory for virtually the
entirety of the existing Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
III. How SHOULD WE THINK ABOUT FEDERALISM AND THE EIGHTH
AMENDMENT?
Despite my misgivings about his account, I share Mannheimer's evident
concern about the scope of federal criminal law and harsh federal
sentences. Mannheimer's core normative position that federal criminal law
encroaches upon state sovereignty seems to me to be an interesting and
important view. In the remainder of this Response, I will describe the ways in
which current jurisprudence can accommodate many of Mannheimer's
ideas without necessarily committing to his reading of the purpose of the
Eighth Amendment.
Consider Solem v. Helm, in which the Court outlined a three-step process
to review punishments for excessiveness. 77 First, courts should compare "the
gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty,"S the gravity of the
offense being determined "in light of the harm caused or threatened to the
victim or society, and the culpability of the offender."7 Second, the Court
stated that "it may be helpful to compare the sentences imposed on other
criminals in the same jurisdiction" to determine whether "more serious
crimes are subject to the same penalty, or to less serious penalties."So Third,
the Court suggested that "courts may find it useful to compare the sentences
imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions."', The
77. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-9 (1983).
78. M. at 290-91.
7g. Id. at 292.
8o. Id.at29g.
St. Id. at 291-92.
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second and third steps of this framework I will call "intrajurisdictional
analysis" and "intejurisdictional analysis," respectively.
I will note before proceeding that the current status of this three-step
test is in flux. First, the three-step test was substantially weakened in Harmelin
v. Michigans8 and in Ewing v. California.A Second, in Graham v. Florida, the
Court, considering a proportionality challenge to a prison sentence,
announced that "the appropriate analysis" was not the one used in Harmelin
and Ewing, both of which dealt with prison sentences, but rather the analysis
used in Atkins, Roper, and Kennedy, all death penalty cases.1 After Graham, it
seems that the Solem-Harmelin-Ewing line of cases may thus end up
becoming obsolete. Nevertheless, it seems to me that there are certain
elements in the Solem framework that are worth reinvigorating.
To explain, let me start with a general theory of the Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence on proportionality in sentencing. In my view, this category of
cases should be read as an instantiation of the retributivist principle that the
harshness of punishment should not exceed the gravity of the crime, or that
one should not be punished more harshly than one deserves. I have
previously defended this reading of the caselaw in detail.
Retributivism, defined as the view that one should receive the
punishment that one deserves and no more, has both comparative and
noncomparative aspects. The noncomparative aspect is obvious: when we say
that it would be clearly disproportionate to punish a parking violation with
one year in prison, that statement would be true even if every parking
violation were treated the same way, and more serious crimes were treated
more harshly. In other words, even if a sentencing scheme generates a series
of sentences that are in perfect comparative desert relationship to one
another, it is possible for some or all of those sentences to be too harsh from
the perspective of retributivism.
That retributivism also has a comparative aspect is less obvious; in fact,
certain philosophers have argued that desert is essentially a noncomparative
idea.6 However, no theory of retributivism is complete without an account
of the role of comparative desert because what one deserves is sometimes
82. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1004-05 (1991) (Kennedy,J., concurring).
83. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 1', 23-31 (003) (plurality opinion).
84. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2023 (2010).
85. See Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Fxcessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV.
677 (2005) [hereinafter Lee, Consiluional Righi]. I refine the argument further in the
following pieces: Youngjae Lee, Why Propmtionality Matters, i6o U. PA. L. REV. 1835 (2012); Lee,
supra note 21; Youngjae Lee, Judicial Regulation o' Fxessive Punishments Through the Eighth
Aim ndmenl, 18 FED. SENT'G REP. 234 (2oo6) [hereinafter Lee, judicial Regdaltion]. Others have
defended alternative readings. See Richard S. Frase, Excessive Pon Sentecmes, Punishment Goals,
and the Eighth Amendment: "Proportionality" Relative to What?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 571 (2005); Alice
Ristroph, P4portionality as a Puinciple ofLimited GornmntI , 55 DKE L.J. 263 (2005).
86. See, e.g., Samuel Scheffler, ]ustice and Deuse/ in Libetal Iheory, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 965,
983-87 (000) (contending that the justification for claims of desert must be individualistic).
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determined in reference to what others deserve. The reason for this is that
the institution of punishment has an expressive dimension. When it
punishes, it condemns the behavior it punishes as wrong, and the degree to
which the behavior is condemned is expressed by varying the amount of
punishment. In other words, when the state punishes, how one's
punishment stands in relation to punishments for other crimes supplies a
crucial piece of information as to how wrong the punished behavior is
viewed by society.
This means that a punishment imposed on a criminal would be
"undeserved" if it is more severe than the punishment imposed on those
who have committed more serious crimes or crimes of the same seriousness
because the judgment it expresses about the seriousness of the criminal's
behavior would be inappropriate. For example, the death penalty carries a
social meaning as the ultimate punishment reserved for only the most
serious crimes. Thus, each time the State imposes a death sentence, it sends
the message that it considers the crime to be not only among the most
serious offenses, but also equally serious to other crimes that society has
labeled-and punished-as the most serious. Those who commit less serious
offenses and are still sentenced to death would receive harsher sentences
than they deserve, because to receive the punishment they deserve they must
be punished less harshly than the worst criminal.
I have argued previously that, for a number of reasons, comparative
desert analysis is crucial for judicial enforcement of the Eighth
Amendment," and the part of the Solem framework that embodies this
comparative desert analysis is the second step, the intrajurisdictional
analysis.9 Through this analysis, the Court can ask how the punishment in
question "fits" into the penal code of a state, and whether it stands in
appropriate relation to punishment for crimes that are as serious or more
serious than the crime for which the punishment is being imposed within
the same jurisdiction. And one advantage of the intrajurisdictional test,
which is of particular relevance to Mannheimer's paper, is that it is a test
that demands internal coherence from states; it does not require them to
conform to the punitive sensibilities of other states or even other countries,
and therefore respects the basic proposition that criminal law is primarily a
matter left to states.
87. Comparative desert is not the same as equal desert. Equality has generally come to
mean equal treatment for similarly situated individuals. Comparative desert, by contrast,
requires this and more: "like cases [should] be treated alike ... [and] unlike cases [should] be
treated in an appropriately unlike way." Thomas Hurka, Desert: hdividualistic and Jolistic, in
DESERI AND JUSTICE 45, 54 (Serena Olsaretti ed., oo3). Differential treatment is thus
fundamental to comparative desert, which the term "equality" does not capture very well.
88. For details, see Lee, Constitutional Right, supra note 78.
89. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 291 (1983).
2 0131] 8 1
SIOWA LAW REVIEW BULLETIN
The interjurisdictional analysis, on the other hand, seems more
problematic, as it puts pressure on states to determine the punishments for
similar crimes based on a national norm determined by other states'
practices. It is for that reason difficult to square with our federalist structure
of government. I have previously argued against the interjurisdictional
analysis for this reason,To except to note that "in our system of government,
another inter-jurisdictional comparison is possible: federal-state
comparison" and that " [t] he nature of the federalism issues that federal-state
comparisons raise is different from the nature of those raised by state-state
comparisons and should be analyzed separately."1 What I had in mind when
I wrote those words was precisely to preserve the possibility of tests like the
one that Mannheimer now proposes, which is "that federal sentences be no
stricter than state sentences for the same crime."a' Accordingly, I am
generally sympathetic to the doctrinal bottom line of Mannheimer's paper.
The question then is whether we can take Mannheimer's doctrinal
proposal without adopting Mannheimer's arguments for it, which are
problematic for the reasons outlined in Part 1.93 It seems to me that the
answer to this question is yes, although I cannot fully develop an alternative
justification here. So let me just say that the interjurisdictional analysis of the
Solem framework, as applied to a federal-state punishment comparison,
provides an avenue to introduce the idea that criminal law is generally best
practiced as a local, not centralized, matter94 without stripping the Eighth
Amendment of its ability to restrain state criminal laws. What we need is an
account that establishes that when the federal punishment for a crime is
much harsher than the state punishment for an equivalent crime, the
federal government should carry the burden of justifying the difference. A
full elaboration of this proposition will require another article, and I look
forward to continuing this dialogue.
go. See Lee, fudiial Regulation, supna note 78.
gi. Lee, Costlitutional Right, sutnn note 78, at 71g9 n.183. Yet another type of
interjurisdictional analysis is the kind that the Supreme Court used in Roper about international
consensus. I have doubts about this practice as well, but my concerns do not apply to the
current context. See Lee, supra note 51, at 67-71 (referencing the Supreme Court's
international consensus analysis in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575-78 (005)).
9. Mannheimer, supna note t, at 74.
93. See supra Part II.
94. See, e.g., WlLLIAM J. STI UNTz, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (201 1);
Rachel E. Barkow, lJderalism and Criminal Law: What the Feds Can Learn fiom the States, 1 og MICH.
L. REV. 519 (011).
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